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Abstract
This paper estimates Taylor rules featuring instabilities in pol-
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trend ination using post-WWII U.S. data. The model embedding the
stochastic target performs better in terms of data-t and identica-
tion of the changes in the FOMCs chairmanships. Policy breaks are
found not to be synchronized with variations in policy shocksvolatil-
ities. Finally, we detect a negative correlation between systematic
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1 Introduction
Taylor rules are often employed to track the U.S. monetary policy behav-
ior (Taylor (1993)). This paper describes the post-WWII Federal Reserves
conduct with a exible simple rule in which policy parameters are free to
switch between states, policy shocks are heteroskedastic, and trend ination
is stochastic.1 We pay particular attention to this last object. According to
Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009), trend ination is the single most im-
portant factor behind the U.S. ination dynamics. We then aim at assessing
the role played by the low frequency component of ination in the estimation
of the dating of the policy shifts, as well as in the investigation of the rela-
tionship between policy regimes and ination persistence. To our knowledge,
this is the rst contribution dealing with a drifting trend ination process
jointly with systematic policy shifts and policy shocksheteroskedasticity.
We nd evidence supporting policy switches and time variation in the
estimated ination target. Crucially, the timing of the switches in the sys-
tematic policy conduct is sensitive to the denition of the ination gap (the
di¤erence between raw and trend ination) policymakers are assumed to re-
act to. In particular, a constant ination target leads to underestimate the
length of the regimes during which the Fed has actively tackled ination (gap)
oscillations.2 Moreover, in presence of a passive regime, the model with a
1In this paper we will use the terms "time-varying trend ination" and "trend-ination"
as synonymous. Ascari (2004) coined the term "trend ination" to indicate a strictly
positive level of steady state ination around which to approximate rmsnon-linear price-
setting rst order condition. For a related theoretical investigation on the role played by
trend ination in a new-Keynesian framework, see Yun (2005).
2Following Leeper (1991), "active" ("passive") monetary policy refers to a policy that
adjusts the nominal interest rate more (less) than one-to-one with movements in ination.
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constant ination target indicates a systematic reaction in line with previous
ndings (see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004), among others). However, when embedding trend ination in the
model, such a reaction gets downsized. This indicates that models with a
constant ination target may underestimate the magnitude of the shift to-
wards a more hawkish policy, so possibly downplaying the relevance of "good
policy" as a driver of the U.S. great moderation.
Interestingly, the model with trend ination appears to capture the his-
torical changes in the Feds chairmanship more precisely than its restricted
xed-target counterpart. Regarding the timing issue, shifts in the system-
atic monetary policy conduct are found not to be synchronized with the
shifts in the volatility of the monetary policy shocks. This result suggests
that the popular "pre- vs. post-Volcker" working hypothesis, often employed
to interpret the post-WWII U.S. ination swings, may o¤er a misleading
(or, at least, incomplete) picture of the di¤erent phases characterizing the
Feds monetary policy conduct. Finally, we nd a regime-dependent inverse
correlation between the systematic monetary policy aggressiveness and the
persistence of the ination gap.
A string of papers has already dealt with instabilities in the U.S. mone-
tary policy rule along several dimensions. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000),
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and Giannoni (2006), and Mavroei-
dis (2009) document breaks in the Federal Reserves systematic reaction to
ination. Elaborating on this hypothesis, Benati and Surico (2009) and Lu-
bik and Surico (2008) show that a small AD/AS model is able to replicate
the great moderation given a policy break in the late 1970s. With a simi-
lar strategy, Benati and Surico (2008) mimic the reduction in ination pre-
dictability occurred since 1985 as documented by, among others, Stock and
Watson (2007) and DAgostino, Giannone, and Surico (2006). Castelnuovo
and Surico (2009) employ such a policy switch to interpret the instability
in the estimated ination response to a monetary policy shock in standard
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VARs. Ireland (2007), Stock and Watson (2007), and Cogley and Sbordone
(2008) lend support to time-varying trend ination. Using di¤erent tech-
niques, Schorfheide (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), Liu, Waggoner, and Zha
(2007), and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) support the relevance of shocks
heteroskedasticity to explain the U.S. macroeconomic dynamics. Most of
these papers deal with one out of the three possibly relevant ingredients
(systematic regime shifts, policy shocksheteroskedasticity, trend ination)
we consider in our analysis.
Another group of contributions is very closely related to our investiga-
tion. Bianchi (2009) and Davig and Doh (2009) nd evidence in favor of
recurrent regime-switches in the systematic policy conduct and the volatility
of policy innovations with Markov-Switching DSGE models. However, they
assume the ination target to be xed in the entire post-WWII period, so
falling short of modeling the low frequency evolution of ination. Cogley,
Primiceri, and Sargent (2009) t multivariate VARs with drifting coe¢ cients
and stochastic volatility to a handful of macroeconomic post-WWII U.S. se-
ries, and establish that the predictability of the ination gap has evolved
over time and has fallen in the great moderation period. Then, they esti-
mate a new-Keynesian framework over di¤erent, predetermined subsamples,
and nd the enhanced stability of the Feds ination target as the single
most important factor behind the reductions in the ination gap volatility
and persistence. Di¤erently, we are agnostic as regards the timing of the
policy breaks, and let the data free to speak along this dimension. With
respect to these contributions, we deal with a partial equilibrium approach,
which admittedly misses to exploit possibly informative cross-equation re-
strictions, but it is obviously more robust to model misspecication. Sims
and Zha (2006) and Davig and Leeper (2006a) also perform single-equation
estimations, and nd evidence in favor of regime-switches and heteroskedastic
monetary policy shocks.3 Again, while they assume a stable ination target,
3Notably, Sims and Zha (2006) nd that their best tting model displays no changes
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we uncover the role played by trend ination in these empirical exercises.
Schorfheide (2005) nds evidence in favor of a switching ination target in
the context of a small scale macroeconomic model. Liu, Waggoner, and Zha
(2007) embed Schorfheides (2005) ination target process in a medium scale
model featuring heteroskedastic macroeconomic shocks, and nd support for
a constant trend ination target over the post-WWII period. Di¤erently, we
focus on a drifting ination target process as the one analyzed by Ireland
(2007), Stock and Watson (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2008), and Cogley,
Primiceri, and Sargent (2009).
Before moving to our analysis, one caveat is in order. Ascari and Ropele
(2009) show that under trend ination a "modied Taylor principle" may
apply, since a more aggressive systematic response to ination uctuations is
needed to induce equilibrium uniqueness.4 This implies that, in conducting
our empirical exercise, we run the risk to label as - say - "active" a policy that,
in Ascari and Ropeles (2009) framework, would possibly lead to multiple
equilibria. However, this does not harm our evidence in favor of an unstable
systematic monetary policy. Moreover, while being theoretically sound, the
quantication of the impact of trend ination on the indeterminacy region
in Ascari and Ropeles (2009) framework has still to be established.5
The structure of the paper reads as follows. The next Section presents
the regime-switching models we estimate. Section 3 proposes and discusses
our empirical ndings. Section 4 concludes.
in the policy rule coe¢ cients and heteroskedastic policy shocks. Nevertheless, they cannot
reject models with an unstable policy rule on the basis of marginal likelihood comparisons.
4In presence of trend ination, the aggregate price index displays an upward trend.
Then, rms able to reoptimize i) set higher prices and ii) assign a larger weight on expected
- relative to current - realizations of the business cycle to avoid the erosion of relative prices
and real prots. This attens the Phillips curve and induces an increase in the sacrice
ratio. Consequently, a widening of the indeterminacy territory occurs.
5The investigation on this issue is left to future research.
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2 Model and estimation strategy
2.1 Model
We consider a Markov-Switching model (Hamilton (1989)) characterized by
two latent processes, S1 = fS1;t; t = 1; :::; Tg and S2 = fS2;t; t = 1; :::; Tg,
which identify the relevant states regarding, respectively, policy conduct and
conditional variances of the models shocks. Our empirical model reads as
follows:
it = (1  S1;t)(r + t + S1;tzt + S1;tyt) + S1;tit 1 + S2;t (1)
t = (1  )LR + t 1 + S2;t (2)
t = 

t + zt (3)
zt = S1;tzt 1 + S2;t (4)
S2;t  N (0; 2S2;t); S2;t  N (0; 2S2;t); S2;t  N (0; 2S2;t) (5)
where i is the short-term nominal interest rate,  is the ination rate,
y is the output gap, r is the unknown long-run real interest rate,  is
the unobservable (possibly) time-varying ination target, z =     is
the ination gap. In particular, S1 and S2 are dened as two independent
binary Markov chains with transition probabilities from state i to state j
Pr[Sk;t = i j Sk;t 1 = j] = pk;ij, k 2 f1; 2g, and i; j 2 f0; 1g.
We relax the original Taylor rule along di¤erent dimensions. First, we al-
low (but do not necessarily require) policy parameters to be state-dependent.
In particular, in the light of the instability of the U.S. monetary policy con-
duct documented by several empirical investigations, we enable the "Taylor
parameter"  as well as the remaining policy parameters  and  to switch
between the two states. Second, we assume the time-varying ination target
to follow the autoregressive process (2), whose persistence is captured by the
parameter  and whose unconditional mean is 
LR.6 We interpret t as
6We assume the variances of the "standard" monetary policy shock and the time-
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trend ination underlying the Feds policy stance conditional on its under-
standing of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. By contrast, the
long-run ination LR is meant to be consistent with long-run goals such as
sustainable growth and employment. We assume the ination gap process
zt to follow the autoregressive process (4). This enables us to estimate the
persistence of the ination gap, which is the relevant policy objective (as op-
posed to raw ination) in presence of a drifting ination target. Consistently,
we allow the persistence parameter S1 to be regime-dependent. Finally, we
assume shocks to monetary policy, trend ination, and the ination gap to be
heteroskedastic, mutually uncorrelated independently distributed martingale
di¤erences.
2.2 Estimation strategy
We estimate our model with Bayesian techniques by implementing an e¢ cient
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) strategy through the Gibbs sampler.7
To deal with identication issues related to "label-switching" (Hamilton,
Waggoner, and Zha (2007)), we impose some constraints on the parameters
space. In particular, the "Taylor principle" asserts that monetary authorities
can stabilize the economy by moving the policy rate more than one-to-one
in response to ination swings. As in the original rule (Taylor (1993)), eq.
(1) has a built-in one-to-one reaction due to the "Fisher relationship" com-
ponent.8 We then impose S1=0 > 0 > S1=1, i.e. we represent "active"
varying ination target to be related to the Markov chain S2;t. In fact, one may instead
interpret them as "policy-related" innovations. Further exercises, not shown for the sake
of brevity but available upon request, conrm the robustness of our results to linking such
shocks to the chain S1;t.
7We conne the details of our estimation algorithm to a Technical Appendix, which is
available upon request. A comprehensive review on MCMC methods for regime-switching
models may be found in Frühwirth-Schnatter (2006).
8It is straightforward to rewrite the Taylor rule (1) in the following (somewhat more
conventional) version: it = (1   S1t)(S1t + eS1tt + S1tyt) + Stit 1 + S2;t where
S1t  r   S1tt , eS1t  1 + S1t . When conditioning to a single state, Woodford
(2003) shows that the systematic monetary policy reaction to ination required to pin
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systematic monetary policy with S1=0 . Following Cogley, Primiceri, and
Sargent (2009), we also assume a lower mean of the ination gap persistence
in correspondence to a tighter systematic policy. Consistently, we employ the
priors S1=0  N (0:4; 0:1) and S1=1  N (0:6; 0:1). Notice that, these priors
notwithstanding, the data are left free to speak as regards the relationship
between policy conduct and the ination gap persistence. As for the second
chain, we impose 2S2=0 > 
2
S2=1
(again, to avoid label switching).
Importantly, we do not take any a-priori stand on the timing of any of
the switches we model. When investigating parameter instabilities with xed
coe¢ cient-models, researchers typically split the U.S. samples at dates cor-
responding to the beginning of Paul Volckers FOMC chairmanship or the
great moderation. This choice is somewhat "natural" and clearly based on
historical events. However, it has some drawbacks. First, it rules out the
possibility of regime switches possibly occurred in the 1960s and during the
great moderation. Second, it forces policy parameters and volatility shocks
to switch contemporaneously. A sample-splitting strategy implemented with
xed coe¢ cients is, by construction, ill-suited to study this situation. By
contrast, with our approach, which allows policy parameters and shocks to
independently shift over time, we are well-equipped to detect heteroskedas-
ticity in the policy shocks within an active systematic policy regime.
We focus on two di¤erent policy rules. Our more exible model allows
the ination target to follow the process (2). To appreciate the contribution
of such stochastic process in our regime-switching context, we also estimate
down a unique equilibrium in a new-Keynesian framework, i.e. the "Taylor principle", iseS1t > 1  (1  )St=, where  is rmsdiscount factor and  is the slope of the Phillips
curve. Notably, if policymakersreaction to business cycle uctuations St > 0, a value
of eS1t lower than one (i.e. a value of S1t lower than zero) can still be consistent with
a unique equilibrium. Therefore, the set of constraints we impose to identify the states
might induce an overestimation of the "passive" monetary policy phases. We performed an
ex-post check based on our estimated S1t and St and conditional to  = 0:99 and  = 0:1
(a calibration widely adopted in the literature), and veried that such overestimation does
not occur, i.e. the "passive" states we obtain remain unchanged when considering the
exact Woodfords (2003) uniqueness condition.
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a version of the model conditional on a xed ination target, i.e. t = 
LR
at all times. We t these two models to U.S. quarterly data spanning the
sample 1955:I-2007:II.9
3 Empirical evidence
3.1 Trend ination
Figure 1 displays the U.S. ination rate along with our two di¤erent esti-
mated ination targets in the post-WWII period. The estimate (posterior
mean) of the xed ination target is 2.09%. A very di¤erent picture emerges
when allowing the target to vary over time. The minimum value is estimated
to be 1.12 in 1962:II, a phase during which ination was well under control.
Not surprisingly, the highest estimate for trend ination falls in 1980:IV, at
the end of the ination drift occurred in the 1970s and just before the dra-
matic disination of the early 1980s. In rst approximation, trend ination
oscillates around a relatively moderate value during the mid-1950s up to mid-
1960s, then it drifts up in correlation with raw ination, somewhat stabilizes
around a new mean value in the second part of the 1970s, dramatically falls
at the beginning of the 1980s, and nally stabilizes during the great mod-
eration. Our estimated ination target is very close to the one proposed by
Ireland (2007) and Stock and Watson (2007), belongs to the 90% credible set
put forth by Cogley and Sbordone (2008), and it is in line - at least, in rst
approximation - with the latent factor identied by Cogley, Primiceri, and
Sargent (2009).
9We retrieved the short-term policy rate (e¤ective federal funds rate), the seasonally
adjusted real GDP level Yt, the estimate of the potential output made by the Congressional
Budget O¢ ce Y t , and the seasonally adjusted GDP deator Pt from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louiswebsite. Quarterly observations of the federal funds rate were obtained
by averaging monthly observations. The output gap was computed as the percentualized
log-deviation of the real GDP from its potential level, i.e. yt  100 log(Yt=Y t ). The
ination rate was calculated as the quarter-by-quarter annualized growth rate of the GDP
deator, i.e. t  400 log(Pt=Pt 1).
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3.2 Estimated coe¢ cients and policy shifts: Model com-
parison
Table 1 reports the posterior mean estimates - along with the [5th; 95th]
percentiles - of our policy rules. Several considerations are in order.
First, in presence of a xed ination target, the estimated Taylor rule
parameters under the active and passive regime line up with those proposed
in the literature.10 By contrast, we observe a dramatic fall in the Taylor
parameter under passive monetary policy when trend ination is stochastic.
The ination reaction is basically halved with respect to that estimated
under the xed ination target assumption, i.e. it moves from 0:79 to 0:35, a
value much lower than those proposed in the literature. Interestingly, under
the active monetary policy regime the posterior mean of the Taylor parameter
is quite comparable between models in terms of magnitude. Consequently,
the presence of a time-varying ination target appears to augment the di¤er-
ence between the reactions to ination in the two regimes. Notably, Cogley,
Primiceri, and Sargent (2009) nd a much larger value of  when focusing on
the 1970s. The di¤erence between their results and ours is likely to be due to
their choice of performing full-system estimations conditional to equilibrium
uniqueness, a choice that forces the parameter  to assume values satisfying
the Taylor principle.
Moving to the remaining parameters, the policy reaction to business cycle
oscillations is clearly larger than zero, and the policy moves are implemented
with substantial gradualism. The persistence of the ination target is large,
with an estimated posterior mean of  equal to 0:97, i.e. a process close to
the random walk employed by Ireland (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2008),
Stock andWatson (2007), and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009).11 Mon-
etary policy shocks and shocks to the ination gap are clearly heteroskedastic.
10See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Table II page 157; Lubik and Schorfheide (2004),
Table 3 (rst and third columns), page 206.
11Consequently, the impact of the long run target LR on the estimated trend ination
is de facto negligible.
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Also trend ination shocks turn out to be heteroskedastic, thus corroborating
the evidence recently put forth by Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009).
Second, our dating of the active/passive regimes displays several depar-
tures with respect to the "pre- vs. post-Volcker appointment" reading of the
post-WWII U.S. ination dynamics. Figure 2 - top panel - plots the evolution
of the probability of being in an active monetary policy regime. While the
1970s are clearly associated to a passive monetary policy regime, the 1960s
are actually related to an active systematic policy conduct. The 1980s and
1990s are also characterized by switches in the policy stance. In particular,
the 1991 recession is clearly pin-pointed as a phase in which the Fed acted
passively.
Third, Figure 2 - top panel - reveals relevant di¤erences in the dating
suggested by the xed vs. trend ination target models. In particular, the
former suggests a switch towards an aggressive monetary policy in 1983:I,
temporally well over the beginning of Paul Volckers chairmanship in August
1979. By contrast, the trend ination model suggests a shift to active policy
in 1980:IV, shortly after Volckers appointment. Going back in time, on Feb-
ruary 1970, Burns was appointed by Richard Nixon as chairman of the Fed.
As stressed by Bianchi (2009), Burns is typically regarded as responsible for
the great ination drift of the 1970s, possibly due to political pressures com-
ing from the White House. Our trend ination model dates the switch from
active to passive monetary policy in 1969:II, very close to Burnsappoint-
ment. By contrast, the xed target model clearly anticipates such event, with
a dating suggesting 1968:I. As regards the 1991 recession, the trend ination
model identies more precisely such an event, suggesting a passive policy
in correspondence to the subsample 1989:III-1993:III, much shorter than the
1987:IV-1994:I implied by the xed target model. The passive conduct might
be interpreted in the light of possible fears for future deation and economic
recession leading the Fed to loosen systematic monetary policy so to inuence
agentsexpectations. In general, the model with a constant ination target
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appears to underestimate the length of the subsamples in which the Fed has
actively fought ination swings.
Importantly, the superiority of the trend ination model is given formal
statistical support. We compute the marginal likelihood via the method
developed by Chib and Jeliazkov (2001).12 This method combines a sequence
of reduced runs of the MCMC algorithm, performed to evaluate the posterior
distributions of the parameters, with a particle lter step, used to compute
the likelihood function (see Doucet, de Freitas, and Gordon (2001) for a
review of the literature). Our marginal likelihood-based comparison, engaged
on the basis of the gures reported in Table 1 (last row), suggests a di¤erence
of about 22 log-points. In the language of Kass and Raftery (1995), this is
"very strong" evidence in favor of time-varying trend ination.
Fourth, our posterior probabilities provide evidence against contempo-
raneous instabilities in the systematic monetary policy vs. policy shocks
volatility. In particular, Figure 2 shows that the recession occurred at the
beginning of the 1960s correlates with a passive monetary policy conduct
featured by low volatile policy shocks. By contrast, the two recessions in
the 1970s are associated to passive monetary policy / high policy shocks,
an evidence consistent with the high ination and output volatilities in the
1970s according to standard AD/AS models. Another interesting asynchrony
emerges when looking at the 2001 recession, which occurred in the aftermath
of the dot-combubble burst. In fact, we nd no systematic policy switch,
a result we interpret as the Feds attempt to stabilize ination expectations.
However, there is evidence of a switch towards high policy shocksvolatility.
Notably, this is a very di¤erent situation with respect to the systematically
passive monetary policy that occurred in the 1970s.
The di¤erence in these two latter policy conducts (i.e. active monetary
policy with high policy shocks vs. passive monetary policy) may be bet-
12A detailed explanation of our algorithm is presented in a Technical Appendix available
upon request.
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ter appreciated when thinking of a regime-contingent Taylor rule coupled
with a standard linearized new-Keynesian AD/AS framework. Working on
the standard hypothesis of rational expectations formed on the basis of the
policy regime in place, a systematically active monetary policy is able to
anchor ination expectations no matter what the volatility of the (white
noise) policy shock is. Consequently, if a linearized model returns a reliable
approximation of the U.S. economic dynamics, one may interpret the 2001
episode as a reaction to the stock market crash leading to a temporary de-
viation with respect to the Taylor rate conditional on a long-run reaction
Taylor parameter satisfying the Taylor principle. Of course, a higher-order
of approximation of the new-Keynesian framework would acknowledge the
role of second moments (namely, switches in the policy shock volatilities)
in inuencing agentsexpectations. To our knowledge, the e¤ects of policy
switches and heteroskedasticity in a non-linear monetary policy framework
are still to be explored.
Finally, we nd statistical evidence in favor of the two-chain set up as
opposed to the single chain framework. When conditioning to a single chain
S1 = S2= S, we obtain marginal likelihoods reading  466:81 for the trend
ination model, and  467:79 for the xed target framework, i.e much worse
than  432:62, which is the marginal likelihood of our best model. Again, our
model embedding the stochastic ination target turns out to be statistically
superior. More importantly, the comparison between the two models with
trend ination substantially favors the more exible two-chain framework,
with a di¤erence in terms of log-points of the marginal likelihood of about
34. This result corroborates Bianchis (2009) and Davig and Dohs (2009)
ndings on the relevance of modeling di¤erent chains for policy parameters
and policy shocks, and casts doubts on the standard "pre- vs. post-Volcker"
interpretation of the post-WWII U.S. monetary policy conduct.
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3.3 Ination gap persistence
In the light of our empirical evidence, the evolution of the ination gap is of
great interest from a policy standpoint. Figure 3 displays the scatter plot of
the realizations of S1 occurring under the passive monetary policy regime
against those obtained under the more aggressive one.13 Pairs located near
the 45 degree line indicate constant persistence between the two regimes.
By contrast, pairs clustered below the 45-degree line represent a decrease in
persistence in correspondence to a systematic policy switch towards active
monetary policy.
The ination gap persistence turns out to be substantially lower in cor-
respondence to an active monetary policy. As much as 96:59% of the pairs
are located below the 45-degree line. The percentages collected by Table 2,
and computed on the basis of di¤erent thresholds (that basically shift the
line downward), suggest a remarkable drop in the ination gap persistence
in correspondence to a switch towards a more aggressive systematic mone-
tary policy. In terms of posterior means, the ination gap persistence falls
from S1=1 = 0:55 to S1=0 = 0:25. These gures corroborate some recent
evidence put forward by Cogley and Sbordone (2008) and Cogley, Primiceri,
and Sargent (2009), are similar to the ination gaps normalized spectrum at
zero frequency (median values) proposed by Benati and Surico (2008), and
support their ndings on the negative correlation between monetary pol-
icy aggressiveness and the persistence of the ination gap. Di¤erently from
these contributions, our result is obtained by considering subsamples iden-
tied with a data-driven procedure, which limits the weight of subjective a
priori assumptions on the timing of the regime shifts.
13These scatter-plots are constructed by employing 25,000 draws from our empirical
posterior densities.
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4 Conclusions
This paper estimates regime-switching Taylor rules with trend ination for
the post-WWII U.S. economy. We nd evidence in favor of regime shifts,
monetary policy shocks heteroskedasticity, and time-variation of the ina-
tion target. Policy breaks are found not to be synchronized with variations
in policy shocksvolatilities. Importantly, the estimated Taylor rule parame-
ters and regime switches are sensitive to the choice of the ination denition
entering the Taylor rule. In particular, a framework embedding an ination
gap modeled with a stochastic trend ination process returns a representa-
tion of the Feds policy conduct closer to historical events (as opposed to
that suggested by a xed ination target rule). Interestingly from a policy
standpoint, we nd that a more aggressive systematic policy is associated
to a lower ination gap persistence. We also nd evidence of "temporary"
deviations from the Taylor rate conditional on active systematic policy, i.e.
situations in which highly volatile policy shocks are consistent with the Fed
meeting the standard Taylor principle. Possibly, this last nding calls for the
employment of non-linear models to assess the impact of such highly volatile
policy shocks on private sectors ination expectations.
Our ndings o¤er support to four quite exciting lines of research. The rst
regards the estimation of DSGE models with regime switching techniques.
Given the instability we found in the U.S. policy rule, two issues are in order.
First, how to solve the model in which agents are endowed with a density
over future possible policy outcomes? Second, how do models embedding
this ingredient square with the data? Theoretical contributions by Davig
and Leeper (2007), Davig and Leeper (2009), Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha
(2008), and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009),14 and empirical endeavors
by Bianchi (2009) and Davig and Doh (2009) o¤er rst answers to these
questions.
14Further considerations on this issue are proposed by Zha (2010).
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The second research line refers to the empirical role played by the time-
varying ination target. Our exercise shows that the use of a stochastic
process for trend ination like the one in Ireland (2007), Cogley and Sbordone
(2008), Stock and Watson (2007), and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009),
leads to a Taylor rule enjoying a superior t of the data. This moves the
attention from raw ination to the ination gap as the relevant policy object.
First investigations on its properties - mainly, its persistence - have been
performed by Cogley and Sbordone (2008), Benati and Surico (2008), and
Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009).
Third, it is key to understand why the ination target evolved over time.
Imperfect knowledge of the economic structure leading to a changing per-
ception of the ination-output trade-o¤ by the Fed is one of the candidate
explanations. Interesting e¤orts in this direction have already been under-
taken by Cogley and Sargent (2005b), Primiceri (2006), Sargent, Williams,
and Zha (2006), and Carboni and Ellison (2009).
Finally, once established that the time-varying ination target is an im-
portant ingredient to describe the U.S. ination rise and fall in the post-
WWII U.S. ination, the switch from the positive to the normative stand-
point appears to be warranted. How should monetary policy be conducted in
presence of trend ination? Interesting rst attempts to tackle this issue are
Ascari and Ropele (2007) and Ascari and Ropele (2009), but more research
in this largely unexplored territory is clearly needed.
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Figure 1: Raw Ination Rate and Estimated Trend Ination.
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Figure 2: Fixed Ination Target vs. Trend Ination: Estimated
Probabilities. Description of the models provided in the text. Smoothed
estimates of the probability of being in the activemonetary policy regime
(upper panel) and in the highvolatility regime (lower panel). Grey vertical
bars identify NBER recessions, red vertical bars identify Feds chairmanships.
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Param: Prior Fixed Target Time-Var. Target
r N (2:0; 1:0) 3:07
[2:19;3:88]
2:95
[1:99;3:76]
1 + S1=0 N (1:7; 0:1)I[1;5] 1:69
[1:12;2:30]
1:67
[1:14;2:28]
1 + S1=1 N (0:7; 0:1)I[0;1] 0:79
[0:47;0:99]
0:35
[0:01;0:88]
S1=0 N (0:25; 0:15) 0:50
[0:05;0:95]
0:57
[0:09;0:96]
S1=1 N (0:25; 0:15) 0:84
[0:46;0:99]
0:86
[0:56;0:99]
S1=0 N (0:8; 1:0) 0:96
[0:92;0:99]
0:94
[0:90;0:97]
S1=1 N (0:8; 1:0) 0:85
[0:77;0:91]
0:74
[0:52;0:88]
2S2=0 IG(2:5; 0:75) 1:76[1:23;2:554]
1:80
[1:22;2:68]
2S2=1 IG(2:5; 0:75) 0:11[0:08;0:16]
0:11
[0:07;0:16]
LR N (2:0; 0:075) 2:09
[1:78;2:36]
2:03
[1:74;2:33]
 N (0:9; 0:1)   0:97
[0:92;0:99]
2S2=0 IG(2:5; 0:75)   0:63[0:20;1:60]
2S2=1 IG(2:5; 0:75)   0:18[0:09;0:32]
S1=0 N (0:4; 0:01) 0:42
[0:25;0:61]
0:25
[0:07;0:45]
S1=1 N (0:6; 0:01) 0:87
[0:79;0:95]
0:55
[0:33;0:78]
2S2=0 IG(2:5; 0:75) 2:76[1:96;3:91]
1:66
[0:71;2:71]
2S2=1 IG(2:5; 0:75) 0:68[0:49;0:95]
0:45
[0:27;0:74]
p01;S1 Beta(5; 95) 0:05
[0:02;0:09]
0:05
[0:02;0:09]
p01;S1 Beta(5; 95) 0:05
[0:02;0:08]
0:06
[0:02;0:10]
p01;S2 Beta(5; 95) 0:06
[0:03;0:10]
0:06
[0:03;0:10]
p01;S2 Beta(5; 95) 0:05
[0:02;0:08]
0:04
[0:02;0:07]
log(ML)    454:87  432:62
Table 1: Estimated Monetary Policy Rules: Fixed vs. Time-Varying
Ination Target. Figures reported in the Table are posterior means;
[5th,95th] percentiles of the simulated posteriors in squared brackets. Mo-
ments of the priors generally report the mean and standard deviation of the
density in brackets, with the exception of the Beta priors for the switch-
ing probabilities, which are dened by their shape parameters. Log Marginal
data density computed using the output of the MCMC simulators. The model
favored by the data attains the highest marginal data density. Description of
the di¤erent models: See Figure 1. Details on estimation procedure reported
in the text.
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Figure 3: Ination Gap Persistence: Scatter Plots. Figure scatter-
plotting realizations of the persistence parameter, x-axis: Passive monetary
policy vs. y-axis: Active monetary policy. Pairs constructed by drawing
25,000 realizations from the estimated posterior densities.
S1=0 < S1=1   k;%
k = 0:05 93:78
k = 0:10 89:43
k = 0:20 74:06
Table 2: Ination Gap Persistence, Joint Density: Probabilities.
Furher explanations on the statistics reported in the table are detailed in the
text.
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Technical Appendix
1 MCMC methodology
In the following, we describe our inferential solution for the model
it = (1− ρS1,t)[r¯ + pit + αS1,tzt + βS1,tyt] + ρS1,tit−1 + ²S2,t (1)
pi∗t = (1− ρpi)piLR + ρpipi∗t−1 + ξS2,t (2)
pit = pi
∗
t + zt (3)
zt = φS1,tzt−1 + ηS2,t (4)
²S2,t ∼ N (0, σ2²S2,t), ξS2,t ∼ N (0, σ2ξS2,t), ηS2,t ∼ N (0, σ2ηS2,t) (5)
In particular S1,t, S2,t are the unobservable two-state first order Markov
chains with transition probability matrix Π = {pk,ij} , k ∈ {1, 2} , i, j ∈
{0, 1}.
The goal of the inferential procedure is to estimate the latent switch-
ing regimes processes Sk = {Sk,t, t = 1, . . . , T}, the unobservable inflation
target pi∗ = {pi∗t , t = 1, . . . , T} and the parameters θ. The observed in-
terest rate is denoted by I = {it, t = 1, . . . , T}, while X = (pi,y), where
pi = {pit, t = 1, . . . , T} is the inflation rate and y = {yt, t = 1, . . . , T} is the
output gap.
Since for non-linear latent factor models the likelihood function is not
available in closed form, inference has to be based on approximations or
i
numerical evaluations. Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) basically avoids
the need to directly computing the likelihood function that is expressed in
terms of a highly multivariate integral. The basic idea behind MCMC is
to build a Markov chain transition kernel starting from a given initial point
and with limiting invariant distribution equal to the posterior distribution of
the quantities of interest. Under suitable conditions (see Robert and Casella,
1999, ch. 6-7), such a transition kernel converges in distribution to the target
posterior density. In practice, the chain is updated to a new position by first
simulating from a given proposal distribution, then by eventually accepting
the move.
In our framework, given the starting vector (θ(0),S
(0)
1 ,S
(0)
2 ,pi
∗ (0)) we sim-
ulate through MCMC the trajectory of the Markov chain {θ(j),S(j),S(j)2 ,pi∗ (j), j =
1, . . . , n} whose draws converge to the posterior distribution p(θ,S1,S2,pi∗|I,X).
Once convergence is achieved, inference can be based on the serially depen-
dent sample generated. More precisely, estimates of the latent factors and of
the posterior mean of θ are given respectively by averaging over the realiza-
tion of the chain, i.e., Pˆ r[Sk,t = 1|I,X] = n−1
∑n
j=1 S
(j)
k,t , pˆi
∗
t = n
−1∑n
j=1 pi
∗(j)
t
and θˆ = n−1
∑n
j=1 θ
(j). To account for serial correlation in the draws, we
estimated the numerical standard error of the sample posterior mean using
the approach implemented in Kim, Shephard, and Chib (1998). MCMC for
switching regime ARMA models have been introduced in Albert and Chib
(1993) and in McCulloch and Tsay (1993) whereas their inferential approach
have been successively generalized in Billio, Monfort, and Robert (1999)
and in Kim and Nelson (1999). In particular Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2001)
proposed an MCMC based solution to address for the parameters identifi-
ii
cation problems related to the switching regime models (see also Fru¨hwirth-
Schnatter, 2006 for a comprehensive treatment of this topic).
Moving the whole vector (θ,S1,S2,pi
∗) in block can be inefficient, since
it is highly multivariate. We implement our MCMC strategy through the
Gibbs sampler, an algorithm that efficiently simulates each element or block
of (θ,S1,S2,pi
∗) in turn from its full conditional distribution, i.e., the distri-
bution conditioned on the data and the remaining components of the vector.
In this case the acceptance probability of moving each sub-block of the vec-
tor is 1. As suggested in Shephard (1994) and Carter and Kohn (1994)
amongst others, updating the whole latent process Sk in block from its joint
distribution given the data and the other parameters should reduce the au-
tocorrelation between states and then speed up the convergence of the chain
to its invariant distribution.
To take care of the regime switches, we provide an efficient algorithm
based on the multi-move Gibbs sampler proposed in Chib (1996) to update
the states S1,t and S2,t, t = 1, . . . , T , whereas we update the parameters and
the latent process pi∗t one component at a time.
To simplify the notation, in the following we call θj the generic j -th
block1 of the vector θ = {θj, j = 1, . . . , J}, θ−j− = (θ1, . . . , θj−1) and θ−j+ =
(θj+1, . . . , θJ). We summarize the algorithm as follows:
1It is worth noting that a block of parameters can be a sub-vector of parameters or a
singleton.
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MCMC algorithm
• Initialize the chain at (θ(0),S(0)1 ,S(0)2 ,pi∗ (0))
• At step j = 1, . . . , n
– Update θ one-at-a-time from the full conditional
p(θi|S(j−1)1 ,S(j−1)2 ,pi(j−1),θ(j)−i− ,θ(j−1)−i+ , I,X) through the Gibbs
sampler algorithm;
– Draw (S
(j)
1,1, . . . , S
(j)
1,T ) in block from p(S1|S(j−1)2 ,θ(j),pi(j−1), I,X);
– Draw (S
(j)
2,1, . . . , S
(j)
2,T ) in block from p(S2|pi(j−1),θ(j),S(j)1 , I,X);
– Draw (pi
∗ (j)
1 , . . . , pi
∗ (j)
T ) one-at-a-time from the conditional
p(pi∗t |S(j)1 ,S(j)2 , pi∗ (j)t−1 , pi∗ (j−1)t+1 ,θ(j), I,X), through Gibbs sampler.
• j = j + 1
In the next subsections we describe the details of the algorithm.
1.1 Updating the parameters
The use of conjugate priors makes it straightforward to update θ. It is easy to
show that the conditional posteriors of σ2²,i, σ
2
ξ,i and σ
2
η,i are Inverse Gamma,
pk,ij are Beta, whereas all the remaining parameters are Gaussian. Since the
full conditional distribution can be simulated directly, each sub-movement of
the chain is accepted with probability 1.
The main issue when estimating regime switching models is identifica-
tion, since the labeling of the states can be permuted without modifying
iv
the marginal likelihood. It is thus common in the literature to impose some
constraints on the parameters’ space. In particular, we find it useful to iden-
tify S2,t by imposing σ
2
²S2=0
> σ2²S2=1 and we implement it in our algorithm
through the permutation sampler of Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2001). Further-
more, to identify the first regime S1,t we hypothesize:
(i) 0 < αS1=0 < 5 and −1 < αS1=1 < 0;
(ii) φS1=0 ∼ N (0.4, 0.1) and φS1=1 ∼ N (0.6, 0.1)
We notice that (i)-(ii) are informative to identify the two states. If for
instance we reverse the constraint, i.e. 0 < αS1=1 < 5 and −1 < αS1=0 < 0
we obtain the exact reverse labeling of the probability of being in S1.
1.2 Updating Sk
We update Sk = (Sk,1, . . . , Sk,T ) in block, moving the two vectors according
to the algorithm proposed in Chib (1996). In the following we focus on S1
since the procedure for S2 is in principle the same. To keep the notation
concise, we define a generic vector Sk,t1:t2 = (St1 , . . . , St2). The method
exploits the following decomposition
p(S1|pi∗, I,X,S2,θ) = p(S1,T |pi∗, I,X,S2,θ)
T−1∏
t=1
p(S1,t|pi∗, I,X,S2,S1,t+1:T ,θ),
(6)
in which the generic term of the product is
p(S1,t|pi∗, I,X,S1,t+1:T ,S2,θ) ∝ p(S1,t|I1:t,pi∗1:t,X1:t,S2,1:t,θ)p(S1,t+1|S1,t,θ).
(7)
v
In particular p(S1,t|I1:t,pi∗1:t,X1:t,S2,1:t,θ) can be written as
p(S1,t|I1:t,pi∗1:t,X1:t,S2,1:t,θ) ∝
p(S1,t|I1:t−1,pi∗1:t−1,X1:t−1,S2,1:t−1,θ)p(it, pit, pi∗t , S2,t|pi∗1:t−1,X1:t−1,S2,1:t−1,θ)
(8)
where
p(S1,t|I1:t−1,pi∗1:t−1,X1:t−1,S2,1:t−1,θ) =
=
1∑
j=0
p(S1,t|S1,t−1 = j,θ)p(S1,t−1 = j|I1:t−1,pi∗1:t−1,X1:t−1,S2,1:t−1,θ)
(9)
These two latter distributions can be numerically evaluated in a recursive
fashion by setting the distribution of the initial state S1,1 as the station-
ary distribution of the Markov chain, p(S1,1|θ). Once computed all these
quantities, S1,T is sampled from p(S1,T |pi∗, I,X,S2,θ), that is a Binomial
random variable, while the remaining states can be directly simulated from
p(S1,t|pi∗, I,X,S2, S1,t+1:T ,θ), starting from S1,T−1 until S1,1.
2 Marginal Likelihood computation
In Bayesian statistics it is common practice to use the marginal likelihood to
measure the goodness-of-fit. This quantity is defined as
m(I,X|M) =
=
∫
p(I,X|pi∗,S1,S2,θ,M)p(pi∗,S1,S2|θ,M)p(θ|M)dθdpi∗dS1dS2,
(10)
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where (M,θ) indicate a given model M and its parameters and p(θ|M)
are the prior distributions. In the following we suppress the model index
M for conciseness. Many techniques have been proposed in the literature to
evaluate the marginal likelihood. A review on some Monte Carlo alternatives
is given in Han and Carlin (2001). In many cases it is useful to recur to the
following decomposition
m(I,X) =
p(I,X|θ)p(θ)
p(θ|I,X) , (11)
that is valid for each point θ on the parameter’ space. Since this ratio is not
dependent on the specific choice of θ, to compute the marginal likelihood is
sufficient to estimate the posterior p(θ|I,X) and the likelihood p(I,X|θ) at
a fixed point θ∗.
2.1 Computing the posterior distribution of θ at θ∗
The first problem is to estimate the posterior p(θ∗|I,X), that is computed
through the method proposed in Chib and Jeliazkov (2001) and is based on a
sequence of reduced run of the same MCMC algorithm used for the inference.
The method consists in dividing the parameters vector θ in blocks, and at
each step of the algorithm associate to the i -th block, a given value θ∗i . In
this way we split the vector into two parts, θ∗−i− and θ−i+ . The estimate of
the posterior at θ∗ is then given by
pˆ(θ∗|I,X) =
J∏
i=1
pˆ(θ∗i |I,X,θ∗−i−), (12)
where each factor pˆ(θ∗i |I,X,θ∗−i−) can be computed as
pˆ(θ∗i |I,X,θ∗−i−) =
1
M
M∑
j=1
p(θ∗i |I,X,pi∗(j),S(j)1 ,S(j)2 ,θ∗−i− ,θ(j)−i+) (13)
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in which θ
(j)
−i+ , S
(j)
k and pi
∗(j) are M draws from the same MCMC algorithm
used for the inference but with (θ1, . . . , θi) fixed to (θ
∗
1, . . . , θ
∗
i ).
2.2 Computing the likelihood
The second issue is to compute p(I,X|θ∗). In fact, the likelihood function is
not known in closed form due to the presence of latent factors, and has to be
evaluated by integrating their effects out. Integration has been performed by
a particle filtering procedure (see Doucet, de Freitas, and Gordon, 2001 for a
detailed description on this topic). Particle filter algorithms provide a sub-
optimal but feasible solution to the Bayesian filtering problem. Consider the
general state-space model defined by the density p(xt|xt−1,θ) that describes
the evolution of the latent states xt and by p(wt|xt,θ) that specifies the
observable wt. Our goal is to estimate the distribution p(xt+1|w1:t+1,θ)
given p(xt|w1:t,θ) in which, as before, w1:t = (w1, . . . , wt) is the past history
of the observable process up to time t. We also require the knowledge of the
initial distribution p(x0|θ), of the transition distribution p(xt+1|xt,θ) t ≥ 0,
and of the measurement distribution p(wt+1|xt+1,θ), t ≥ 1. The key idea
is to approximate the filtering density p(xt+1|w1:t+1,θ) by a discrete cloud
of points called particles, x
(j)
t+1, j = 1, . . . , N , and a set of weights ω
(j)
t+1 as
follows
pˆ(xt+1|w1:t+1,θ) =
N∑
j=1
ω
(j)
t+1δ(xt+1 − x(j)t+1), (14)
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta measure. The cloud of points at time t+ 1 are
chosen by using the importance sampling principle, in which the importance
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density is q(xt+1|x(j)t , wt) and the weights are
ω
(j)
t+1 ∝ ω(j)t
p(wt+1|xt+1,θ)p(x(j)t+1|x(j)t ,θ)
q(x
(j)
t+1|x(j)t , yt)
j = 1, . . . , N. (15)
In our context xt = (pi
∗
t , S1,t, S2,t), whereas the observable vector at t is
wt = (it, pit, yt). The algorithm can be summarized as follows:
Particle filter algorithm
• At time t, given a weighted sample (pi∗t , S1,t, S2,t, ωt)(j) , j = 1, . . . , N
from p(pi∗t , S1,t, S2,t|I1:t,X1:t,θ∗)
– Draw (pi∗t+1, S1,t+1, S2,t+1)
(j), j = 1, . . . , N from the importance
density, that in our case is p(pi∗t+1, S1,t+1, S2,t+1|pi∗ (j)t , S(j)1,t , S(j)2,t ,θ∗).
– Compute ω
(j)
t+1 using eq. (15).
– Store
(
pi∗t+1, S1,t+1, S2,t+1, ωt+1
)(j)
, j = 1 . . . , N that provide an
approximation of p(pi∗t+1, S1,t+1, S2,t+1|I1:t+1,X1:t+1,θ∗);
• t=t+1
Once the states are filtered, it is easy to evaluate the likelihood by
p(I,X|θ∗) =
T∏
t=1
pˆ(it, pit, yt|I1:t−1,X1:t−1,θ∗) (16)
where p(it, pit, yt|I1:t−1,pi1:t−1,θ∗) can be estimated by integrating out the
latent processes through a Monte Carlo procedure, for instance by simu-
lating the state (S1,t, S2,t, pi
∗
t ) from p(S1,t, S2,t, pi
∗
t |(S1,t−1, S2,t−1, pi∗t−1)(j),θ∗),
j = 1, . . . , N and in which (S1,t−1, S2,t−1, pi∗t−1)
(j) is the outcome of the filter-
ing procedure at time t− 1.
ix
References
Albert, J. H., and S. Chib (1993): “Bayes Inference via Gibbs Sam-
pling of Autoregressive Time Series Subject to Markov Mean and Variance
Shifts,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 11, 1–15.
Billio, M., A. Monfort, and C. Robert (1999): “Bayesian estimation
of Switching ARMA models,” Journal of Econometrics, 93, 229–255.
Carter, C. K., and R. Kohn (1994): “On Gibbs Sampling for State Space
Models,” Biometrika, 81, 541–553.
Chib, S. (1996): “Calculating posterior distributions and modal estimates
in Markov mixture models,” Journal of Econometrics, 75, 79–97.
Chib, S., and I. Jeliazkov (2001): “Marginal Likelihood from the
Metropolis-Hastings Output,” Journal of the American Statistical Asso-
ciation, 96, 270–281.
Doucet, A., N. de Freitas, and N. Gordon (2001): Sequential Monte
Carlo Methods in Practice. Springer, New York.
Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter, S. (2001): “Markov Chain Monte Carlo Estima-
tion of Classical and Dynamic Switching and Mixture Models,” Journal of
the American Statistical Association, 96, 194–209.
(2006): Finite Mixture and Markov Switching Models. Springer,
Berlin.
x
Han, C., and B. Carlin (2001): “MCMC Methods for Computing Bayes
Factors: A Comparative Review,” Journal of the American Statistical As-
sociation, 96, 1122–1132.
Kim, C. J., and C. Nelson (1999): State-Space Models with Regime
Switching: Classical and Gibbs-Sampling Approaches with Applications.
MIT Press.
Kim, S., N. Shephard, and S. Chib (1998): “Stochastic Volatility: Likeli-
hood Inference and Comparison with ARCH Models,” Review of Economic
Studies, 65, 361–393.
McCulloch, R., and R. S. Tsay (1993): “Statistical Inference of Macroe-
conoomic time series via Markov Switching models,” Journal of Time Se-
ries Analysis, 15, 523–539.
Robert, C., and G. Casella (1999): Monte Carlo Statistical Methods.
Springer, Berlin.
Shephard, N. (1994): “Partial Non-Gaussian State Space,” Biometrika,
81, 115–131.
xi
